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Previous studies of the office market have tended to focus on either the 
rental market or the aggregate sales market. This paper focuses on the intra-
metropolitan sales market and on office price and trading volume dynamics 
in Hong Kong. According to our findings, buildings trading at higher prices 
are not necessarily traded more often than those trading at lower prices. In 
addition, the price of offices in different categories does not necessarily move 
in tandem. The trading volumes of higher priced buildings tend to Granger 
cause the lower priced buildings, and this conclusion is robust to alternative 
classifications. The paper contrasts several existing theories. Suggestions for 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the sales market of offices within a single metropolitan area. 
While many studies have been done on intra-metropolitan residential property prices, 
far fewer have been done on the sales market of offices within one metropolitan 
area.
1 Many of the studies that have been done tend to focus on the local or national-
level (among others, see Eppli, Shilling and Vandell, 1998; Sivitanidou and 
Sivitanides, 2000; Wheaton, 1987; Wheaton and Torto, 1988; Wheaton et al, 1997).
2 
In addition, previous studies of the office market have disproportionately emphasized 
the rental market (among others, see Sivitanidou and Sivitanides, 1999, 2000; 
Sivitanidou 2002, and the references therein). This may be partly due to the fact that 
the rental market dominates office properties in the United States. 
 
Parallel studies in other countries may prove difficult. First, the rental market may 
not dominate. Second, the needed information for rental market studies may not be 
accessible. For instance, “side deals” such as rent-free periods, the inclusion of 
management fees, the inclusion of utilities, contract-completion rebates, conditional 
renewal agreements, etc., are very common in the Hong Kong office rental market,
3 
and they also vary from firm to firm and over time. Unfortunately, information on 
such deals is not publicly available in Hong Kong. In addition, some commercial 
property rental contracts are quite lengthy, lasting as long as three to five years. Thus, 
the data set needs to cover a rather long period in order for contract renewal to be 
observable in the data. While such time series are available for the US market, it 
would be a considerable big challenge to analyze such data from other countries. 
 
Given these limitations, this paper will instead focus on the sales market of offices.
4 
In particular, this paper will study intra-metropolitan office price and trading volume 
dynamics. This is an important issue because several existing property market 
theories have implications for the dynamics of price and trading volume. As will 
become clear, some refinements of the existing theories are needed. The study of the 
sales market of offices may indeed be a promising approach, especially for cross-
country comparisons as sales information is usually recorded by governments for tax 
and other purposes. While it is clear that a survey of the literature is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we will nevertheless tabulate our literature review in Appendix I 
to facilitate comparison. It suffices to say that this paper will be substantially 
different from the existing literature in terms of the dataset, the focus, and the results. 
 
1 
The literature on residential property price is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see Chau et al (2004), Englund, 
Quigley and Redfearn (1998), Hwang and Quigley (2004). 
2 Needless to say, there are also contract/loan level studies (among others, see Ambrose and Sanders, 2003; Fu et al, 2003; 
Gunnelin and Soderberg, 2003; Patel and Sing, 2000). Again, such detailed datasets are not common, making related and follow-up 
studies very difficult. 
3 We confirm this statement with industry participants, who are unwilling to disclose their identities. 
4 In terms of research ideas, this paper is also related to the “spatial-temporal approach” in the residential property literature, such 
as Tu et al (2004), and the reference therein. We consider the spatial dimension to be less important for commercial property, 
especially for a small geographical area like Hong Kong and we simply take office buildings as a given unit to start with. Intra-metropolitan Office Price and Trading Volume Dynamics    49 
 
 
In terms of research strategy, this paper will construct indices for different “classes” 
of office, based on all the information that we can access, which includes more than 
24,000 transactions involving 601 office buildings. Note that a direct study of all 
these buildings is virtually impossible. First, we would need to find some metrics to 
compare more than 1,000 time series (each building has a time series of price as well 
as trading volume). Second, some buildings are less frequently traded than others, 
and it is possible that some “outliner transactions” might contaminate the dataset. 
Aggregating the office buildings into classes would “average out the noises”. For this 
reason, aggregating the 601 office buildings into a much smaller number of classes 
seems to be a much preferred strategy (more discussion of this will follow). This 
paper will focus on the following questions: 1.) whether different classes of offices 
do in fact move together in terms of the transaction price and of the trading volume, 
and 2.) whether one particular class of office drives the rest. 
 
Clearly, these questions carry important implications. For instance, if the price 
movement of different classes is very different, the construction of a city-level price 
index might be subject to serious aggregation bias. It might also mask the important 
intra-metropolitan dynamics among different classes of offices. 
 
In principle, all of the office sales transactions taking place during the sample period 
should be included in the EPRC, which is the dataset that we have employed. If this 
is the case, then all of the office sales transactions in Hong Kong taking place during 
the sample period would be included in our dataset. 
 
Note that these indices are transaction-based. For this reason, this paper is not subject 
to the appraisal-smoothing debate (see Geltner, 1991, and Lai and Wang, 1998, 
among others). Perhaps more importantly, the causality relationship among different 
classes of offices will shed light on the transmission mechanism of shock within the 
property market. To clarify this point further, it may be instructive to compare this 
with the case of residential properties. Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2004, 2006) have 
established that the causality goes from lower-priced to higher-priced units, which is 
consistent with the collateral-based theory of property market price and trading 
volume fluctuations. Thus, if the firms have some “consumption motives” for office 
space, and they are also subject to collateral constraints as with households, we 
would expect that the causality would go from the lower-priced to the higher-priced 
units. This would be the first possible relationship between lower and higher-priced 
units. It will be later referred to as the Hypothesis I. 
 
Firms, however, might differ from households, facing less severe financial 
constraints, and hence the collateral-based mechanism would be significantly 
weakened (see Leung and Feng, 2005, for more discussion of this point). Moreover, 
the “consumption motive” may not exist in offices. Thus, the price of lower-priced 
units might not Granger cause their higher-priced counterparts. In fact, firms might 
want to “move down the ladder” by selling a higher-priced unit and move to a lower-
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for other purposes. In that case, we would expect the causality in price and trading 
volume to be from a higher-price unit to a lower-priced unit. This is the second 
possible relationship between the lower- and higher-priced units. It will later be 
referred to as Hypothesis II. 
 
Needless to say, if the capital market is perfect and lower-priced and higher-priced 
units are perfect substitutes, we could expect the prices of small and large units to 
move together. This is the third possible relationship between the lower- and higher-
priced units. It will later be referred to as Hypothesis III. 
 
There is a fourth possibility. If the information is incomplete, less-traded properties 
might be difficult to price, and there might be an inclination for information on 
more-traded units to be used to adjust their price expectations.
5 The price causality 
should therefore go from office buildings that are being traded more frequently to 
those that are being traded less often. In this case, we should categorize office 
buildings according to their trading volume (or a proxy of the liquidity) rather than 
their price. And we should observe the causality from groups with higher trading 
volumes to those with lower trading volumes. This will later be referred to as 
Hypothesis IV. 
 
In sum, price and trading volume dynamics in the office market can be very different 
from those in the residential market. More importantly, they can provide an indirect 
test of alternative theories of property market dynamics (see Kan et al, 2004, for a 
dynamic general equilibrium model that exhibits a similar pattern). Table 1a 
summarizes our discussion. 
 
 
Table 1a  Summary of Hypotheses 
 
I  Lower-priced units causes higher-priced units 
II  Higher-priced units causes lower-priced units  
III  Higher-priced units and lower-priced units co-move 
IV  Higher volume units causes lower volume units 
 
 
The “spatial-temporal approach” found in residential property literature such as Tu et 
al (2004) and the references therein were taken into account when this paper’s 
research strategy was determined. We decided that in a city such as Hong Kong, 
where commercial properties are clustered in a relatively small geographical area, 
the spatial dimension was less relevant. We simply took office buildings as a 
convenient starting point. 
 
                                                        
5 We have had private correspondence with several market practicing professionals, and they 
all support this theory. Intra-metropolitan Office Price and Trading Volume Dynamics    51 
 
Office buildings in Hong Kong are concentrated in a few prime locations – 
especially at the higher end. According to research by the Jones, Long and LaSalle, 
Tsang (2005), 29% of Grade A office space in Hong Kong is located in the city’s 
Central Business District. The Wanchai/Causeway Bay corridor, which is just north 
of Central, holds another 21%. The island’s Eastern District, which is right next to 
the Wanchai/Causeway Bay corridor, holds another 12%. Across the harbor is 
Kowloon’s Tsimshatsui district, which accounts for another 14%.  
 
Together, these four districts account for more than three-fourths of Hong Kong’s 
Grade A office space. What is more, these districts are clustered geographically very 
close to one another. Therefore, a classification of office buildings based on 
geography would not yield very good results (see Leung et al, 2006). Furthermore, if 
prices are largely determined by geographical location, as in the case of the Ricardo 
model, and if price causality runs from better-located properties to those with less 
favorable locations, we would still observe price causality from higher- to lower-
priced offices according to our classification (see Ricardo, 1817; 1965). Thus, our 
proposal to study the price and volume causality would still be a meaningful test of 
competing theories. 
 
The Hong Kong government never formally announces which office buildings 
belong to grades A, B, and C and whether they adjust these classification over time. 
Because we are unable to use the government’s classification of office buildings, we 
have decided to classify office buildings based on our own objective and quantitative 
criteria, differentiating office buildings into 10 classes instead of the three used by 
the Hong Kong government. More detailed explanations will be provided henceforth. 
 
The Hong Kong market was chosen for several reasons. To start with, it is well 
known for having a simple tax system. Secondly, it has a fixed exchange rate in 
relation to the US dollar. Next, it treats foreign investors equally. There are no capital 
controls and no capital gains tax. The property market is relatively active (see Leung 
et al, 2007, for more evidence). Finally, the capital market is relatively well-
developed. 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section describes the dataset 
and the econometric tools. The following section presents the empirical findings and 
the interpretations. The final section is the conclusion. 
 
 
2.    Data Description and Econometric Method 
 
2.1 Data  Source 
 
The dataset we employed was collected by the Economic Property Research Center 
(EPRC), which in turn collected all of the transactions recorded by the Land Registry 
Department of the Hong Kong Government. It contained information about building 
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as the corresponding gross feet, net feet, gross foot price, and net foot price. The 
sample period for the analysis ran from January 1992 to December 2004. Our 
research focused on the sales market of the Hong Kong office market, with more 
information and higher accuracy than the rental counterpart. 
 
The research includes all buildings with more than four transactions from January 
1992 to December 2004 and includes complete information on transaction dates and 
transaction prices as well as corresponding gross square footage and net square 
footage to construct the quarterly data employed in this study. For our entire sample, 
we have a total of 601 estates and have made more than 24,000 observations. 
 
In order to examine the robustness of a full sample, a restricted sample was selected. 
These were composed of estates having had at least 52 transactions during the 
sampling period, i.e., on average, each selected estate had at least one transaction 
during the three-month period. We had a total of 120 estates in the restricted sample. 
Ding (2006) found that the results from the full sample and the restricted sample 
were essentially the same. For this reason, this paper will focus on the full sample. 
Tables 1 and 2 will provide more information about the dataset. 
 
 
Table 1b   Number of Estates in Each Sampling Group 
 
 
Sample Group  No. of Estates 
Full Sample (total no. of transactions >4)  601 
Restricted Sample (total no. of transactions >=52)  120 
Table 2a   Summary  Statistics  of  Volume, office buildings sorted by ROR 
(Full Sample) 
 
Group   Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Group 1  19 300  71.55769  58.36747 
Group 2  4 267  42.63462  49.07299 
Group 3  9 190  46  36.26482 
Group 4  11 358  61.21154  62.61126 
Group 5  14 345  64.96154  71.32911 
Group 6  15 180  44.71154  34.15095 
Group 7  12 115  49.80769  26.71787 
Group 8  10 88  32.30769  18.99901 
Group 9  13 81  29.53846  14.08443 
Group 10  6 35  18.15385  7.437016 
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Table 2b   Summary Statistics of Volume, office buildings sorted by Volume 
(Full Sample) 
 
Group   Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Group 1  63 799  219.6538  175.6225 
Group 2  22 283  75.98077  55.99842 
Group 3  12 161  46.38462  32.79057 
Group 4  3 139  32.61538  24.93612 
Group 5  7 73  25.13462  15.07631 
Group 6  5 75  19.48077  12.4782 
Group 7  2 49  14.96154  8.659035 
Group 8  2 36  11.67308  7.00342 
Group 9  1 33  8.576923  5.248141 
Group 10  0 17  6.423077  3.862064 
 
 
2.2    Measurement of Trading Volume and Office Prices 
 
In this study, as in many related studies, trading volumes were measured according to 
the number of times an estate had been transacted in a given quarter (See Leung et al, 
2002, and Leung and Feng, 2005, among others, and the references therein). When it 
came to calculating the price of an office, we employed the realized rate of return as 
the de-trended office price and used the relative transaction value as a weight to 
create an index. The transacted value was calculated as the product of price per 
square foot and the construction area. Since some estates only had gross areas, some 
only had net areas, and some had both, we chose the net area as a priority The idea 
was that a higher value transaction (relative to other transactions in the same estate 
and period) would contain more information about the market. Formally, the index is 
constructed as follows:  
 
∑ = ij ij ij ij i Q P Q P W  




where i is the index of the estate, j is the number of transactions of the i estate per 
quarter, P is the nominal price per square foot, Q is the constructed area, and   is 
the weighted average price per quarter. To facilitate cross-period comparisons, the 
weighted average price per quarter is deflated by the quarterly composite consumer 
price index (CPI) (1992=1). The real rate of return (ROR) is the change of percentage 
of the real price. That is, 
P %
 
CPI P P i i
~
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where  P* is the real office price per quarter of a specified estate and RORt the 
realized rate of return, which can also be interpreted as the real de-trended office 
price or simple real office price. From this point on, we will use the term “real office 
price” and “ROR” interchangeably. This study focused on the effective sampling 
period, which starts with the first actual transaction period for each estate. After the 
effective sampling period begins, if another other zero transaction period follows, in 




3. Econometric  Method 
 
As we discussed in the introduction, we will split the sample into 10 equal-sized 
groups twice: first by descending order of the total trading volume (as a proxy of 
liquidity) and secondly by descending weighted average office price (as a proxy of 
quality). The last group will always have 61 buildings, with the others having 60. 
 
Clearly, the use of alternative sorting methods highlights different dimensions of the 
market and so can also help to improve the robustness of the results. Notice that 
although the number 10 is somewhat arbitrary, the results do not seem to be very 
sensitive to this. And it is already much better than the government’s classification, 
which has only three categories. Perhaps more importantly, the four hypotheses 
outlined do not depend on the number of classes in the data and should therefore 
hold true in general. Without any a priori knowledge, this choice seems to be 
acceptable. As we have split the sample into 10 categories, there should have been 
enough trading for each type within each period. 
 
A simple correlation test and Granger causality tests of group volumes and  prices 
were conducted. Similar methods were applied to the restricted sample (see Ding, 
2006) for more details. Tables 3a and 3b provide some basic statistics of the 10 
categories under different classifications. We also computed the correlation of prices 
between groups falling into different classifications. Table 4 shows that the 
correlation is far from being uniform. This confirms that the two classification 
methods do, in fact, rank office buildings differently. In particular, the correlation of 
prices between group i (ranked by price) and group i (ranked by volume), i = 1, 2, 3 
are, in general, very low. In other words, office buildings with higher prices are not 
necessarily being traded more often. The price and the trading volume of the 
building level are not as correlated as in the aggregate. On the other hand, the 
correlation of volumes is positively significant, reflecting some kind of consistency. 
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Table 3a   Summary Statistics of ROR, office buildings sorted by ROR (Full 
Sample) 
Group Min  Max  Mean Std.  Dev. 
Group 1  -0.5876 1.95204  0.034406  0.329773 
Group 2  -0.4059  0.764871 0.013924 0.190167 
Group 3  -0.36961 0.83092 0.008961  0.215808 
Group 4  -0.45428 0.403183 -0.00028 0.135383 
Group 5  -0.2832  0.387924 -0.00169 0.138188 
Group 6  -0.66969 1.30954 0.016486  0.251244 
Group 7  -0.57738 1.475486 0.011802 0.255855 
Group 8  -0.47721 1.192872 0.013125 0.23779 
Group 9  -0.51321 0.566973 0.011208 0.204498 
Group 10  -0.52022 0.960298 0.018369 0.269945 
 
 
Table 3b   Summary  Statistics  of  ROR, office buildings sorted by Volume 
(Full Sample) 
Group Min  Max  Mean Std.  Dev. 
Group 1  -0.60818 1.982352 0.034265  0.332764 
Group 2  -0.68537 2.022708 0.050003  0.387081 
Group 3  -0.62344 0.787426 0.057204 0.33792 
Group 4  -0.61867 1.660154 0.058072  0.417386 
Group 5  -0.38094 0.83926 0.024309  0.273031 
Group 6  -0.60545 2.885353 0.07618 0.552682 
Group 7  -0.47299 1.047905 0.046027 0.34612 
Group 8  -0.57793 1.338889 0.066384  0.370358 
Group 9  -0.5541 1.405929  0.067872  0.40459 
Group  -0.71249 5.173311 0.165256  0.828395 
 
 
One may object to this way of classifying office buildings because it does not 
explicitly take the location factor into account. As we have already explained, while 
location may be important in other places, it is not necessarily important in Hong 
Kong. First, Hong Kong is geographically small. Leung et al Wong (2006) found that 
the geographical factor might not be important in determining the “substitutability” 
of office buildings in different districts. Second, the location of office buildings is 
endogenous. In particular, as Tsang (2005) has shown, most of the quality office 
buildings are concentrated in Central and Tsimshatsui, making separate identification 
of different factors difficult to determine. Third, the way the Hong Kong government 
classifies offices buildings is neither transparent nor refined. They are simply divided 
into three broad categories. Nevertheless, to address the potential concerns that we 56    Leung, Cheung, and Ding    
 
anticipate, we will also conduct a district-level analysis, which will yield a similar 
pattern. Owing to space limitations, we will present this analysis in Appendix III. In 
the main text; we will focus on the classifications of office buildings based on price 
and trading volume. 
 
Table 4   Correlation of Volume and Price, office buildings sorted by Volume 
and Price Separately (Full Sample) 






Price(Volume sorted, ROR 
sorted) 
Group1  0.7648* 0.8908* 
Group 2  0.7391* -0.1169 
Group 3  0.7943* 0.053 
Group 4  0.7495* 0.4325* 
Group 5  0.7178* 0.2297 
Group 6  0.6054* 0.0983 
Group 7  0.6499* -0.3586* 
Group 8  0.6791* 0.1611 
Group 9  0.4668* 0.1884 
Group 10  0.5452* 0.1326 
 
 
4. Empirical  Results 
 
The empirical results will be presented in the following order. First, the matrix of 
correlation coefficients of the volume and ROR of groups will be illustrated for both 
full and restricted samples. Second, we will calculate the correlation coefficients of 
volume and ROR ranked by volume and real price separately within each group. 
Third, in order to examine the lead-lag relationship of volume and real price 
separately, we will check the Granger causality for volume and the ROR for each 
group for both full and restricted samples. 
 
4.1  Correlation of Volume and ROR 
 
Table 5a displays the matrix of correlation coefficients of volume when the buildings 
are ranked by real office price for the full sample. It is clear that every group is 
highly correlated with the other groups. And a similar pattern emerges when the 
buildings are ranked by trading volume (see Table 6b). It seems safe to conclude that 
the trading volumes among different groups are highly correlated. One might be 
tempted to interpret this in terms of substitution among different office buildings. 
However, the correlation coefficients among groups do not display any monotonic 
patterns, suggesting that the “substitution effect” may not be the driving force in this 




Table 5a   Correlation of Volume, office buildings sorted by ROR (Full Sample) 
 
Group  gp1 gp2 gp3 gp4 gp5 gp6 gp7 gp8 gp9  gp10 
gp1 
Note: * denote that it is significant at the 1% confidence level. 
1            
gp2  0.7110*  1          
gp3  0.8061*  0.8847*  1         
gp4  0.5675*  0.5978*  0.6390*  1        
gp5  0.5821*  0.7876*  0.7210*  0.7164*  1       
gp6  0.4629* 0.5204* 0.6013* 0.6827* 0.6211*  1         
gp7  0.5945* 0.7249* 0.7618* 0.6897* 0.7362* 0.6608*  1       
gp8  0.6219* 0.5415* 0.6686* 0.7879* 0.6171* 0.6966* 0.6673*  1     
gp9  0.5396* 0.4764* 0.5212* 0.8032* 0.5830* 0.6932* 0.6508* 0.8099*  1   
gp10  0.5426* 0.4188* 0.5163* 0.6088* 0.4743* 0.6074* 0.6061* 0.7106* 0.6684*  1 
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Table 5b   Correlation of Volume, office buildings sorted by Volume (Full Sample) 
 
Group  gp1 gp2 gp3 gp4 gp5 gp6 gp7 gp8 gp9  gp10 
gp1  1            
gp2  0.8155*  1          
gp3  0.8820*  0.8732*  1         
gp4  0.8535*  0.8062*  0.9278*  1        
gp5  0.7232* 0.7961* 0.7297* 0.6908*  1           
gp6  0.8229* 0.7950* 0.8175* 0.8285* 0.6684*  1         
gp7  0.7266* 0.7679* 0.8256* 0.8611* 0.5779* 0.7515*  1       
gp8  0.6454* 0.7292* 0.7424* 0.7507* 0.6584* 0.7497* 0.6694*  1     
gp9  0.7389* 0.6415* 0.7588* 0.8069* 0.4768* 0.8179* 0.7081* 0.6427*  1   
gp10  0.6312* 0.6320* 0.5773* 0.5763* 0.5523* 0.5836* 0.5241* 0.5431* 0.5440*  1 
Note: * denote that it is significant at the 1% confidence level. Intra-metropolitan Office Price and Trading Volume Dynamics    59 
 






The results of the de-trended office price, or ROR, pose a further challenge to the 
hypotheses outlined above. Table 6a displays the matrix of correlation coefficients of 
ROR when the buildings are ranked by real office price for the full sample. We find 
that only five pairs of significant correlations are examined, which is in sharp 
contrast to Table 5a. The same conclusion holds when the buildings are ranked by 
trading volume, as in Table 6b. It is shown that when the buildings are sorted by 
district, the correlation of the ROR is even more absurd, with only three significantly 
high correlations.  
 
4.2  Granger Causality Tests 
 
Interaction among office buildings need not be contemporary. To entertain the 
possibility of dynamic interactions, especially to test the different hypotheses 
concerning the lead-lag relationships among “higher groups” and “lower groups,” we 
conducted the Granger causality tests of volume and ROR ranked by real office 
prices, volumes, and district prices separately. Table 7a displays the results of the 
Granger tests of volume when the buildings are ranked by real price in descending 
order. We can see that group one only significantly Granger causes the volume trends 
of groups two, four, and six. Groups two, four, five, eight, and nine Granger cause 
several other groups. However, the ordering is not uniform, and the pattern is not 
clear. 




Table 6a   Correlation of ROR, office buildings sorted by ROR(Full Sample) 
 
Group  gp1 gp2 gp3 gp4 gp5 gp6 gp7 gp8 gp9  gp10 
gp1  1            
gp2  0.1352  1          
gp3  -0.1411  0.0363  1         
gp4  0.4999*  0.3627*  0.1262  1        
gp5  0.1547  0.4933*  0.1998  0.3385  1       
gp6  0.2126 0.0898 0.1223  0.325  0.296  1         
gp7  -0.0147 -0.0544 0.0182 -0.0573 -0.0613 -0.1236  1       
gp8  0.111  0.3205  0.1655 0.4657* 0.2092  0.003  -0.1181  1     
gp9  -0.1969 0.2154 0.4717* 0.2927 0.1884 0.0949 -0.0458 0.2324  1   
gp10  0.0566 0.1919 -0.1949  0.265  -0.033  0.1217 -0.1418 0.2098 0.1322  1 
Note: * denote that it is significant at the 1% confidence level.  




Table 6b   Correlation of ROR, office buildings sorted by Volume (Full Sample) 
 
Group  gp1 gp2 gp3 gp4 gp5 gp6 gp7 gp8 gp9  gp10 
gp1  1            
gp2  0.1441  1          
gp3  0.1529  0.2902  1         
gp4  0.2262  0.1599  0.096  1        
gp5  -0.2049 -0.1351 -0.2638  0.078  1           
gp6  0.0511  -0.0062  0.0169  0.102  0.1749  1      
gp7  -0.2024 -0.1393 -0.0162 0.2573  0.2435  0.1149  1       
gp8  0.2185 -0.184 0.0516 0.1172 0.1125  -0.0198  0.5345*  1     
gp9  0.0728 -0.0206 0.3538 -0.0048 0.1144 -0.1314 0.1873 0.4109*  1   
gp10  0.0032 -0.0451 0.1139 0.0743 0.0805 0.0913 0.4189*  0.4341*  0.3669*  1 
Note: * denote that it is significant at the 1% confidence level. 62    Leung, Cheung, and Ding    
 
On the contrary, when the groups are volume-ranked, Table 7b shows that group one 
Granger causes all other groups. Group two exhibits a similar pattern except for 
group six. In general, higher-ranked groups tend to Granger cause the lower-ranked 
groups in trading volume. Thus, the results in the office market are in sharp contrast 
to the residential market. It is consistent with the explanation that when collateral 
constraints and up-trading incentives are less important, the causality from the lower-
priced units to the higher-priced units disappears. On the other hand, it is puzzling 
that the causality is from higher-ranked to lower ranked units in trading volume 
when the office buildings are volume-ranked, but not when they are price-ranked. 
These patterns are not completely consistent with the hypotheses outlined before (see 
Table 1a). Clearly, more refinement in the theoretical aspects is needed. 
 
 
Table 7a   Granger Causality of Volume, office buildings sorted by ROR (Full 
Sample) 
Group  gp1 Gp2 gp3 gp4 gp5 gp6 gp7 gp8 gp9 gp1
gp1    Y N Y N Y N N N N 
gp2  Y    Y Y Y N N N Y Y 
gp3  Y  N    N  Y  N N N Y  N 
gp4  Y  N  Y    Y  N N N Y  N 
gp5  Y Y Y Y    N  Y  N  Y Y 
gp6  N N N N N    N N N N 
gp7  N N N Y  N N    N  Y  N 
gp8  N  Y Y N  Y Y Y    Y  N 
gp9  N N Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y 
gp10  N N N N N Y Y Y Y   
 
Table 7b   Granger Causality of Volume, office buildings sorted by Volume 
(Full Sample) 
 
Group  gp1  gp2 gp3 gp4 gp5  gp6 gp7 gp8 gp9 gp10 
gp1    YYYY  YY Y Y Y  
gp2  Y    Y Y Y N  Y Y Y Y 
gp3  N N   Y Y Y Y  Y  N  Y 
gp4  N  Y Y    N  Y Y  Y  N N 
gp5  Y Y  Y  Y   Y Y  Y  Y  Y 
gp6  Y  N N N N    Y  N N  N 
gp7  N  Y  N N N Y    N N  N 
gp8  N  N N N N N N   N N 
gp9  Y  N N N N Y  N N    N 
gp10  N N  N  N  Y  N  Y  N N   Intra-metropolitan Office Price and Trading Volume Dynamics    63 
 
Table 9 summarizes the Granger causality tests of volume for both full and restricted 
samples. The results are similar. Almost half of the Granger causality results of 
volume exhibit a significant lead-lag relationship among groups by the three 
grouping methods. 
 
By the same token, we conducted the Granger causality tests on pricing among 
different groups. The results were very different. For our full sample, no matter how 
the office buildings were categorized, almost none of the groups showed a significant 
causality effect on the other groups. The only exception was group three (price 
ranked) Granger caused four other groups. In particular, while in general the higher-
ranked office buildings Granger caused the lower-ranked in trading volume, they 
failed to carry the same causality in terms of office prices. None of the hypotheses 
discussed above could account for this phenomenon (again, see Table 1a). 
 
Table 8   Summary of Granger Causality in Volume 
  Full Sample  Restricted Sample 
42  (Total) 




Price  46.67% 100% 46.67% 100% 
45  (Total) 




Volume  50% 100%  46.67%  100% 
24  (Total) 




District  57.14% 100%  53.33%  100% 
 
 
Table 9a   Granger Causality of ROR, office buildings sorted by ROR (Full 
Sample) 
 
Group gp1 gp2 gp3 gp4 gp5 gp6 gp7 gp8 gp9 gp10 
gp1     N N N N N Y  N N N 
gp2  Y     N  Y  N N Y  N N N 
gp3  N N    Y  N N Y Y Y N 
gp4  N  N N    N  N N Y  N  Y 
gp5  Y  N N N    N  N N N N 
gp6  N  N N N N     N  N N N 
gp7  N  Y  N N N Y     N  N  N 
gp8  N N N  Y  N N Y     Y Y 
gp9  N  Y  N N N Y  N N    N 
gp10  N  N  Y  N N N N N Y    64    Leung, Cheung, and Ding    
 
Table 9b    Granger Causality of ROR, office buildings sorted by Volume (Full 
Sample) 
Group gp1 gp2 gp3 gp4 gp5  gp6  gp7  gp8  gp9  gp10 
Gp1    N N N Y  N N N  N Y 
Gp2  N    N N N N  Y  N N  N 
Gp3  N  Y    Y  N N  N  N  N  Y 
Gp4  N  N N    N  N N N  N N 
Gp5  Y  N N N    N N N  N N 
gp6  Y  N N N Y    Y  N N  N 
gp7  Y Y N N N N    Y  N  Y 
gp8  N  Y  N N N N  Y    N N 
gp9  N  N N N N  N  N  N    N 
gp10  N  N  Y  N N  N  N  N  Y   
 
 
In Table 10, which summarizes all of the results, we can see that no more than 30% 
of the tests are significant, which is in sharp contrast to what happens with volume. 
Perhaps more importantly, no group seems to be the “benchmark” of the others. 




Table 10   Summary of Granger Causality in ROR 
  Full Sample  Restricted Sample 
21  (Total) 





23.33% 100% 23.33%  100% 
18  (Total) 





20% 100%  13.33%  100% 
5  (Total) 








5. Estimation  of  Markov  Chain Model Estimation 
 
One possible explanation of the “negative results” identified in the previous sections 
is that office buildings frequently move up and down across groups, making all of Intra-metropolitan Office Price and Trading Volume Dynamics    65 
 
the correlation and Granger tests difficult to interpret. To entertain this concern, we 
also estimated a Markov chain model on our restricted sample to study the 
persistence of the return performance of estates. Since the first year of the whole 
period contains limited information, we started with the year 1993. The office 
buildings were categorized as follows: first we ranked the buildings in each and 
every quarter according to their corresponding real price in descending order. There 
were 84 office buildings with transactions throughout the12-year sampling period, 
and they were put into six groups. A Markov chain was then estimated. 
 
Given the limits of space, we could only focus on the principal diagonal elements 
(see Table 11a). They indicated the probability of an office building staying in the 
original group for another period, which in some sense indicated the “stability” of 
the relative price/return performance of different office buildings (see Young and 
Graff (1996, 1997). For example, in 1993, there was a 76.19% chance of an office 
building that was ranked in the first group in the time period t remaining in the same 
group the following year. Clearly, the principal diagonal elements of each group 
were usually larger than the non-diagonal elements of the corresponding row so the 
return performance of each group could be considered persistent. Moreover, the 
buildings in the polar groups (i.e. groups 1 and 6) had a very high probability of 
remaining in their original group, showing that mobility at the two ends of the office 
building distribution were relatively low, which is consistent with some previous 
research (for instance, see Lee & Ward, 2000). 
 
 
Table 11a  Within-Group ROR Persistence of Office Buildings from 1993 to 
2004 
Year  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5  Group 6 
1993  76.19  40.48  54.76  54.76  54.76  73.81 
1994  71.43  42.86  50  64.29  64.29  80.95 
1995  78.57  47.62  45.24  57.14  57.14  76.19 
1996  78.57  45.24  38.1  40.48  50  71.43 
1997  80.95  64.29  50  61.9  57.14  73.81 
1998  76.19  40.48  26.19  30.95  21.43  61.9 
1999  73.81  64.29  59.52  57.14  52.38  78.57 
2000  73.81  52.38  45.24  47.62  52.38  73.81 
2001  73.81  59.52  61.9  45.24  52.38  66.67 
2002  73.81  64.29  57.14  59.52  61.9  71.43 
2003  76.19  61.9  61.9  45.24  57.14  71.43 
2004  78.57  69.05  59.52  54.76  50  64.29 
Whole 
Sample  76.29  54.71  51.06  52.28  53.5  72.04 
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On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the persistence of the in-between groups 
significantly (and only temporarily) dropped in 1998 (i.e., during the Asian financial 
crisis). It seems to suggest that a crisis does have an impact on the intra-metropolitan 
price dynamics of an office market. It seems to be a research topic to be further 
explored  
 














1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6
 
 
For comparison, we performed the same analysis on the real housing price of 
residential estates in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the term “estate” refers to a group 
of buildings – usually quite tall – that are built in the same neighborhood, at about 
the same time, usually by the samee developer. There is no exact parallel in the 
United States. The closest thing might be a housing development. In Hong Kong, the 
population of some large estates is huge, which means that some of them constitute 
distinct communities. For details of the data used, see Leung and Cheung (2006). 
 
Table 11b represents the elements of the principal diagonal from 1992 to 2004, 
which indicates the probability of a residential estate remaining in the original group 
for the following month (Ding, 2006, provides all transition matrices in each year). 
As in the case of office buildings, the principal diagonal elements of each group were 
always larger than the non-diagonal elements of the corresponding row, indicating a 
high degree of persistence. In addition, the estates in the polar groups also had a very 
high probability of remaining in their original group (although there were some 
exceptional situations in the early part of the sampling period). This demonstrates 
that the relatively low mobility at the two ends of the distribution of residential 
estates was applicable for both kinds of real estate asset. 
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On the other hand, both Table 11b and Figure 3 suggest a drop in the persistence of 
the relative ranking of prices after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, especially the 
polar groups (one and six), which seems to be in sharp contrast with what happened 
with office buildings.
6 Unlike office buildings, the drop in those two groups did not 
show any “rebound”. The dramatic V-shaped drop of the persistence for most groups 
of office buildings in the year 1998 was not found in the residential property market. 
Instead, the year 1998 was just at the midway point of decreasing within group price 
persistence. 
 
In general, the six time frames for the analysis of office buildings seemed to fluctuate 
around some group-specific constant. However, the six time frames for the 
residential market exhibited a break, or level drop, in the persistence level in 1998. It 
seems to be another piece of evidence that even when we stuck to the sales market, 
the office and residential property markets did, in fact, behave very differently. 
 
5.1 Robustness  Checks 
 
As an earlier draft of this paper was being circulated, serious doubts were forwarded 
to the authors. To address some of these doubts, we have performed some robustness 
tests. Owing to space limitations, we will briefly explain them in this section.  
 
 
Table 11b  Within-Group ROR Persistence of Residential Estates from 1992 
to 2004 
Year Group 1G r o u p 2G r o u p 3  Group 4G r o u p 5G r o u p 6 
1992  68.18 62.12 65.15 71.21 78.79 93.94 
1993  84.85 77.27 81.82 78.79 86.36  100 
1994  81.82 72.73 71.21 74.24 87.88  100 
1995  86.36 77.27  69.7  74.24 86.36 93.94 
1996  89.39  84.85  86.36 80.3 87.88  98.48 
1997  86.36 80.3 77.27  75.76  86.36 100 
1998  77.27  65.15  68.18  72.73 80.3 92.42 
1999  78.79 63.64 71.21 71.21 66.67 87.88 
2000  78.79 63.64 62.12 62.12 68.18 89.39 
2001  77.27 62.12 62.12 62.12 72.73 89.39 
2002  78.79 68.18 68.18 57.58 63.64 87.88 
2003  78.79 72.73 65.15 63.64 66.67 83.33 
2004  75.76 69.7 71.21  71.21 80.3 89.39 
Whole 
Sample  80.11 70.75 70.75 70.43 78.17  92.9 
 
                                                        
6 Limited by the sample size (13), we are unable to conduct a meaningful structural break test 
formally. 68    Leung, Cheung, and Ding    
 














1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year
Percentage
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6  
 
One of the serious objections was that the draft ignored the possibility of a structural 
change in 1997, the year when Hong Kong was handed over to China and when the 
Asian financial crisis began. We therefore split the samples into two sub-samples: 
1992 Q1 through 1997 Q4 and 1998 Q1 through 2004 Q4. A clear consequence of 
sample-splitting was the reduction of the sample size, which might have had an 
impact on the significance of the test statistics, especially for Granger causality. The 
correlations and causality were in general weak, but the basic pattern was sustained. 
There was no clear pattern in terms of the price across different groups, while the 
causality in volume was in general from the “higher groups” (higher-priced or more 
frequently traded) to the “lower” ones. 
 
Another objection that caught our attention was the potential bias owing to the 
existence of seasonal factors. Theoretically, it is not clear why seasonal factor would 
lead to more significant causality in volume than in price. Nevertheless, to address 
this concern, we ran a simple regression with a constant term, an autoregressive term, 
and three seasonal dummies. None of the volume-regressions displayed any 
significance for seasonality. For price-regression, seasonal dummies were significant 
in only two groups when the buildings were sorted by volume. It seems safe to 





Although the exercises conducted in this paper are technically simple, they contain 
important messages. One important finding of this research is that the trading volume 
of commercial property displays a clear lead-lag relationship. There is also a Intra-metropolitan Office Price and Trading Volume Dynamics    69 
 
significant correlation – in general, from higher volume groups to lower ones) – 
while the majority of office estates shows neither a significant correlation nor a lead-
lag relationship in price. Almost half of the Granger causality results of volume 
exhibit a lead-lag relationship among groups. The results are almost the same for 
both full and restricted samples. These findings are in sharp contrast to the case of 
residential properties, where the price and volume of lower-priced properties 
typically drive their counterparts in the higher-priced sector (for examples, see 
Ortalo-Magne and S. Rady, 1999, 2005, and the references therein). 
 
The results further indicate that the widely cited “benchmarking hypothesis,” which 
is a form of “informational friction,” may not be strong enough to be statistically 
significant. It then leads to the question of what determines the price and trading 
volume dynamics among different classes of office building. Existing search-
theoretic models are silent on the issue of dynamics between higher and lower priced 
office markets. In other words, existing hypotheses of office market dynamics are 
either silent on or inconsistent with the stylized facts established in this paper. 
Clearly, more effort on theoretical and empirical works is needed to solve this 
empirical puzzle. 
 
This paper carries implications for the construction of a city-level index. Regardless 
of the sorting method used, real office prices are not always significantly correlated. 
It leads to the concern that an “aggregate” city-level price index may not be a very 
informative device although it is a widely used practice. On the other hand, the 
trading volumes among different classes are highly correlated. Thus, it may indeed 
be appropriate to construct a city-level trading volume index.  
 
This observation leads to one possible direction for future research. 
Macroeconomists have long been aware that the regional dynamics (in terms of 
output and other macroeconomic variables) may be significantly different from the 
aggregate counterpart (for an example, see Quah, 1996a). They go further and derive 
methods to test whether there is any trend of convergence among different “regions” 
to the “aggregate” (for an example, see Quah 1996b, c). Alternatively, they derive 
methods to characterize the “distributional dynamics” and how they are related to the 
“aggregate dynamics” (for an example, see Quah, 1997). If the office prices of 
different classes do not move together, now is perhaps the time for real estate 
economists to examine the “convergence” issue and the “distributional dynamics” 
issue in the context of the office market. 
 
Needless to say, the econometric methods used here are relatively simple. It is 
possible that to revisit these conclusions with more non-linear models. Our current 
sample, however, has only 52 periods, or quarters, and may not be an ideal sample 
for those techniques. A dataset with a longer time horizon and more transactions is 
needed. 
 
A comparison of the Markov chain model estimates of the office and housing 
markets reveals further differences between the two types of property. In particular, 70    Leung, Cheung, and Ding    
 
the persistence in relative price ranking in the office market seems to be more robust 
than in the residential market, especially when the market was impacted by the Asian 
financial crisis. It may be somehow counter-intuitive because we expect that the 
“neighborhood” (including the geographical location, the school district, the crime 
rate, etc.) is relatively stable and should be more important to residential property 
prices than to office property prices. The “polar groups” (the highest and lowest 
priced properties) in the office market seem to be more stable than the other groups 
in the office market. It seems to be the opposite for the residential market. Clearly, 
much more empirical as well as theoretical work is needed to understand the 
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